Since the 1962 war, the two countries have concluded various bilateral agreements as confidence-building measures (CBM) to avoid an escalation of the situation, including the high-profile 1996 agreement and the „dominant practice“ of not using weapons near the LA, which stems from this agreement and others. We have described the various bilateral agreements and the governmental and international sources to which they can be accessed: Signed in New Delhi on 11 April 2005, the English text of the protocol appears on the bilateral/multilateral documents page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India (MEA). A copy and summary of the protocol can also be accessed in the UNITED Nations Peacemakers Database and the AP-X Peace Agreement database. The aim of the protocol is to implement previous agreements and „modalities for implementing confidence-building measures, including through procedures for exchanging information on troop movements and holding semi-annual meetings on border issues.“ They also agreed to resolve by diplomatic means any violation of the treaty or a solution. The 15 June border conflict reportedly took place during an obvious „de-escalation process“, weeks after „high-ranking military commanders from both countries“ agreed on 6 June to „peacefully resolve the situation in the border areas, in accordance with various bilateral agreements“. The collision on the ridge reportedly involved hand-to-hand combat with iron bars, stones and fists, resulting in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese soldiers. While neither side carried rifles, most of the soldiers killed in the fighting lost their footing or were pushed by the narrow back of the Himalayas and fell to death. These are the first deaths along the LAC since 1975. China violated three important bilateral agreements in 1993, 1993, 1996 and 2013 – which were essential to maintaining peace and calm in the controversial line of real control.

Until now, no soldiers had been killed on either side of the LAC for more than four decades. Surprisingly, nowhere in the 1993 agreement is there a provision to recognize the existing lines of intervention of the armies concerned, as they were in 1993. The agreement does not reflect any attempt by each party to recognize the other party`s line at the time of its signing. That would have been the logical starting point. If both armies are to respect the LAC, where is the line? The lack of clarity on the LAC has led to a persistent sense of unease and insecurity, contributing exponentially to military construction in these areas. The lack of definition of this line always allows for further clandestine progress on the ground. Monday night`s escalation was an extension of an aggressive attitude to LAC, although discussions on de-escalation were underway. Indeed, the 1993 agreement clearly states that, if in doubt, the two parties will „examine together“ the harmonization of the LAC. The main excerpt from the 1993 agreement: „No activity by both parties shall cross the line of effective control.

If personnel on one side cross the effective control line, they must immediately withdraw to the other side of the actual line of control after a warning. If necessary, the two parties examine and determine together the segments of the ingenious line of control when they have different views on their orientation. Although the exact details of the collision of 15 Some experts have drawn attention to a number of factors, including both parties citing violations of existing agreements, military rearmament and infrastructure/road development near the LAC, and the revocation of Jammu-Kachmir`s autonomous status by the Indian government, which led to the creation of the Lakhda Union Empire as a contribution.